Optimistic Fair-Exchange with Anonymity for Bitcoin Users by Jayasinghe, Danushka et al.
Optimistic Fair-Exchange with Anonymity for
Bitcoin Users
Danushka Jayasinghe, Konstantinos Markantonakis and Keith Mayes
Smart Card Centre, Information Security Group,
Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, UK, TW20 0EX
Email: {Danushka.Jayasinghe.2012, K.Markantonakis, Keith.Mayes}@rhul.ac.uk
Abstract—Fair-exchange and anonymity are two important
attributes in e-commerce. It is much more difﬁcult to expect fair-
ness in e-commerce transactions using Bitcoin due to anonymity
and transaction irreversibility. Genuine consumers and merchants
who would like to make and receive payments using Bitcoin may
be reluctant to do so due to this uncertainty. The proposed proto-
col guarantees strong-fairness while preserving anonymity of the
consumer and the merchant, using Bitcoin as a payment method
which addresses the aforementioned concern. The involvement of
the trusted third party (TTP ) is kept to a minimum, which makes
the protocol optimistic and the exchanged product is not revealed
to TTP . It achieves dispute resolution within the protocol run
without any intervention of an external judge. Finally we show
how the protocol can be easily adapted to use other digital cash
systems designed using public ledgers such as Zerocoin/Zerocash.
Keywords—Anonymity, Optimistic Fair-Exchange, Bitcoin.
I. INTRODUCTION
The e-commerce market is growing and is expected to
double from a value of C755 billion in 2010 to an expected
C1460 billion in 2015 [19]. Yet there are issues with regards to
the anonymity and fairness of transactions in an e-commerce
environment. In a traditional Point-of-Sale (POS) transaction,
a consumer can maintain anonymity by using cash rather than
handing personal ﬁnancial details to the merchant and the
correctness of the goods purchased can be immediately ver-
iﬁed. In an E-commerce scenario, however, where transacting
parties do not see each other physically, it is much easier for
a dishonest party to misbehave and payment is not usually
anonymous. Anonymity prevents merchants and other parties
from learning consumer personal information, spending habits
and ﬁnancial details. This would also help reduce fraudulent
activity related to theft of consumer ﬁnancial details. Currently
the majority of e-commerce does not fully offer anonymity,
although services such as PayPal can be used to hide personal
ﬁnancial details from the merchants.
As a result there have been attempts to give e-commerce
users the freedom of making anonymous payments without
having to reveal personal ﬁnancial details and to guarantee
fair-exchange [21], [22], [20], [17]. The main contribution of
this paper is the optimistic fair-exchange protocol proposed
in section IV. In recent years there has been a dramatic
increase in the use of Bitcoin as an alternative payment
method in e-commerce. Due to the fact that Bitcoin payments
being anonymous and irreversible, it is much more difﬁcult
to expect fairness in e-commerce transactions while using
Bitcoin. Genuine consumers and merchants who would like to
make and receive payments using Bitcoin may be reluctant to
do so due to this uncertainty. There are current solutions such
as “e-bay Guarantee” and “PayPal Buyer Protection” for non-
Bitcoin transactions. Even though, these methods have capped
transaction values or involve lengthy dispute resolutions, they
provide a level of peace of mind for consumers. Currently
there seems to be no option for Bitcoin users to enjoy such
peace of mind in e-commerce. Bitcoin has now become a
competitive player for alternative payment methods with a
considerable market capitalisation. yet, to our knowledge there
are no speciﬁcally designed e-commerce protocols for Bitcoin
that addresses aforementioned concerns and this paper is one
of the ﬁrst Bitcoin-speciﬁc proposals that guarantees strong-
fairness and anonymity.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II,
we explore related anonymous payment protocols. Section III
examines related fair-exchange protocols. In Section IV, we
propose our protocol and in section V, a security analysis of
the protocol is carried out. In Section VI, we add an extension
to our protocol to support the improved Zerocash system for
Zerocoin. Finally in Section VII, we conclude our discussion
and provide further research directions.
II. ANONYMOUS PAYMENT PROTOCOL SCHEMES
Protocols that help realise anonymity and user privacy
during payment are called Anonymous Payment Protocols.
Anonymous payment protocol systems can be categorised as
on-line payment systems and off-line payment systems. In
an on-line scheme the payer, payee and the bank needs to
be connected on-line at least once during the protocol for
veriﬁcation of coins. Proposals include [10], [8], [9]. In off-
line schemes the Trusted Third Party (TTP) does not have to
be on-line but veriﬁes whether coins have been double-spent
when the payee deposits it in to his/her account.
A. Bitcoin
Bitcoin is a decentralised digital cash system which works
on a peer to peer network. The system was ﬁrst proposed and
developed by Satoshi Nakamoto (pseudonym) in October 2008.
Bitcoin system is widely used to make anonymous payments
over the Internet. Every payment that occurs in the Bitcoin
network is broadcast to all network nodes. The process of Bit-
coin peers authorising transactions and creating new Bitcoins
is called Bitcoin mining. A user can generate a unique Bitcoin
address also known as a Bitcoin public key by using an Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) key [6], [16]. A
Bitcoin transaction is the process of transferring a Bitcoin by
digitally signing a hash of a previous transaction together with
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the next owners public Bitcoin address and adding this record
to the end of the coin. This chain of signature ownership links
past transactions to the present transactions. The creation of
blocks and veriﬁcation of Bitcoins by peers in the network is
made a fair and non-trivial task by introducing a Proof of Work
method. With this concept, peers needs to generate hashes
until a hash value is generated with a certain number of zero
bits at the beginning of the hash. The work needed increases
exponentially as the required number of bits in the beginning
increases. As a result, a constructed block cannot be easily
changed [16]. The security of Bitcoin transactions rely on the
correctness of the Block Chain [16], [6]. Bitcoin transactions
are anonymous and irreversible. A consumer would not be able
to request a refund or prove to any party that the product was
not delivered. The proposal in this paper is designed to address
this concern.
III. FAIR-EXCHANGE PROTOCOL SCHEMES
Fairness can be categorised as Weak and Strong fairness.
Weak fairness is when two parties engage in an electronic
transaction, after the protocol-run, the honest party can prove
to an external judge that he/she followed the protocol even
though the dishonest party did not [17]. Strong fairness or true
fairness ensures that the protocol itself tries to resolve disputes
and misbehaving of parties without having to reach an external
judge. These protocols make sure that a honest party engaged
in a transaction does not get penalised when a dishonest party
misbehaves [1]. Protocols that are built to achieve fairness in
e-commerce transactions are called Fair-exchange Protocols.
A combined solution that would realise fairness as well as
anonymity is called an Anonymous Fair-exchange Protocol.
Only few Anonymous Fair-exchange Protocols for exchanging
electronic content have been proposed in academic literature
[13], [21], [22], [20]. Fair-exchange protocols can be divided in
to two main categories considering the involvement of a trusted
third party (TTP) or not. Two party protocols do not rely on a
TTP to achieve fairness. Examples include [7], [4]. However,
these protocols lack simultaneity of exchange where parties
could misbehave for their own advantage during transactions.
TTP based fair-exchange protocols can be classiﬁed into three
categories. In-line: Involves the TTP to collect exchanged
items, check their accuracy and ﬁnally forward them to the
intended parties. Proposals include [3], [11]. The involvement
of the TTP, provides strong fairness. However, the TTP is
required to be available any-time to manage and maintain large
databases of communicated messages which can be considered
as a major bottleneck. On-line: Similar to the above but the
TTP does not involve in every transmitted message. However,
TTP still engages in the protocol run to guarantee fairness by
validating, storing and generating transmitted messages. Ex-
amples include [12], [23], [22]. Off-line: Lets the transacting
parties exchange products without the intervention of a TTP
unless one of the parties misbehaves, prematurely aborts or a
communication failure happens. These protocols are also called
“Optimistic Protocols”. Examples include [8], [2], [13]. The
proposed protocol in this paper keeps the involvement of a
TTP to a minimum by using an Off-line TTP.
IV. PROPOSED PROTOCOL
The objectives of the proposed protocol are listed below.
Mentioned in Table I is the notation used in the proposed
protocol. Illustrated in Figure 1 is a diagram of the proposed
protocol’s message ﬂow between the protocol entities.
 The protocol should achieve strong fair-exchange while
preserving anonymity of the consumer and the merchant.
 TTP should not be able to see the exchanged product or
store a copy of it.
 Guarantee security properties such as; conﬁdentiality,
integrity, message freshness and non-repudiation.
 Keep the involvement of the TTP to a minimum.
 Disputes should be resolved within the protocol.
 The protocol should support similar digital cash systems.
TABLE I. NOTATION USED IN THE PROPOSED PROTOCOLS
C/M /TTP /PV : Consumer / Merchant / Trusted Third Party / Product
Veriﬁer.
BP2P : The Bitcoin Peer-to-Peer Network.
Ti : Purchase/delivery transaction of product m by C and M .
Pseudo-ID-M : Unique Pseudonym-Identity ofM registered with the PV .
Pseudo-ID-iX : Unique Pseudonym-Identity of X registered with the
TTP , only used during Ti.
K1 : Public encryption key of the public/private key pair es-
crowed with TTP , later used by PV to encrypt m.
K−11 : Private decryption key of the public/private key pair es-
crowed with TTP . The key pair is generated by M .
eK1{Z} : Encryption of data string Z using a public algorithm with
K1.
PX : Public Encryption Key of entity X .
ePX{Z} : Encryption of data string Z using a public algorithm with
the public encryption key PX of entity X .
SX : Private Signature Key of entity X .
sSX [Z] : Digital signature outcome (without message recovery)
from applying the private signature transformation on data
string Z using the private signature key SX of entity X .
VX : Public Signature Veriﬁcation Key of entity X .
PwM : Public Encryption Key of M advertised online with m.
PiX : Public Encryption Key of entity X used only during Ti.
ePiX{Z} : Encryption of data string Z using a public algorithm with
the public encryption key PiX of X used only during Ti.
SiX : Private Signature Key of entity X used only during Ti.
sSiX [Z] : Digital signature outcome (without message recovery)
from applying the private signature transformation on data
string Z using SiX of X only during Ti.
ViX : Public Signature Veriﬁcation Key of X only during Ti.
ViXcert : Public Signature Veriﬁcation certiﬁcate issued by the
TTP . It includes ViX corresponding to the Pseudo-
ID-iX of entity X used only during Ti.
BPX : Bitcoin Public Key of entity X (X’s Bitcoin address).
BSX : Bitcoin Private Key of entity X (X’s Signature key).
sBSX{Z} : Digital Signature outcome (without message recovery)
from applying the private signature transformation on data
string Z using BSX of X .
T -info : Other information relevant to a particular Bitcoin transac-
tion.
TX : Bitcoin transaction from C to M , in the formation of a
hash.
TX = h(T(X−1)||BPC ||T -info).
TX−1 : Previous Bitcoin transaction that has occurred in the past
but directly linked to TX in the formation of a hash.
Encryptcert : Encryption certiﬁcate issued by the PV . It includes a hash
of the encrypted product which has been encrypted by the
PV using the key indicated in the certiﬁcate.
TTPcommit : Commitment certiﬁcate issued by the TTP indicating
involvement in the exchange.
TTP -Pool : A pool of different TTP s. C & M agrees between one
TTP from this list to be involved in Ti.
PVcert : Product veriﬁcation certiﬁcate issued by the PV .
ú−payment : Predeﬁned time-out for M to send the decryption key,
includes time needed for Bitcoin transaction processing.
ú : Predeﬁned time-out period agreed by involved parties. If
a response is not received within the time-out the sending
party will resend once more, in case a no reply, the sending
party aborts the protocol or involve the TTP if necessary.
ú−resolve : Time-out given to M by TTP to respond with the
requested key before sending the escrowed product decryp-
tion key to C.
A||B : Concatenation of A and B in that order.
h(Z) : Hash of data string Z.
N1X / N2X : First & second nonce issued by entity X .
X → Y : Z : Entity X sends message Z to entity Y .
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Fig. 1. Proposed protocol message ﬂow.
The protocol can be broken down into three stages. The
ﬁrst stage is the “Pre Protocol” where product registration,
product/price negotiation, TTP selection and product en-
cryption happens. The second stage is the “Main Protocol”
where product delivery, Bitcoin payment and decryption key
delivery happens. If things go according to plan the protocol
completes in the above two stages, but if a transacting party
misbehaves, prematurely aborts or a communication failure
happens the third stage “Extended Protocol” is executed with
the involvement of the TTP . The assumptions mentioned in
Table II have been taken in to account for a successful run of
the protocol.
TABLE II. ASSUMPTIONS IN THE PROPOSED PROTOCOLS
A1 : M registers with PV by giving a Pseudo-ID-M , PM and VM
which are only used in communication between M and PV . The
PV certiﬁes M ’s public veriﬁcation key VM and keep a record of it
to verify M ’s messages signed using SM in future communication.
A2 : Both C and M register with TTP by giving a per-transaction
pseudonym-identity Pseudo-ID-iC and Pseudo-ID-iM . The
TTP makes sure that each Pseudo-ID is unique and has not been
registered before. It should not be possible for TTP , C, M or
external parties to deduce the real identity of C and M by examining
the Pseudo-ID.
A3 : C’s and M ’s public veriﬁcation keys ViC and ViM are certiﬁed
by the TTP to their pseudonym-identities Pseudo-ID-iC and
Pseudo-ID-iM respectively. The public certiﬁcates ViCcert &
ViMcert are issued to each owner by TTP and can later be used
to verify each other’s digital signatures.
A4 : C and M have access to a Bitcoin wallet. M generates a one-time
Bitcoin address to be presented to C to receive payments and only if
needed, C generates a one-time Bitcoin address to receive any change
back form the transaction also known as a change-address.
A5 : C and M , in addition to pseudonyms, maintain anonymity by setting
up Anonymity Channels (uses cryptographic processes to change
message origin details and prevent eavesdropping) for communication.
A6 : All cryptographic keys are checked for validity before use, standard-
ised public key algorithm (e.g. RSA) is used for encryption, data is
padded according to recommended best practice before encryption,
hashes are generated using standardised secure hash functions (e.g.
SHA) and messages are signed using a standardised digital signature
algorithm (e.g. DSA).
A. Pre Protocol Stage
The Pre Protocol messages are listed in Table III and
described in detail below.
Firstly, M advertises the unique product-ID generated
by M , product-price, product-description and a public key
PwM online. The website M uses to advertise these details
does not necessarily have to be his/her own site but could also
be a third party listing service. M also advertises a TTP -
Pool which is a list of TTP s that could be involved in the
transaction. A consumer wishing to purchase a product, selects
a TTP from TTP -Pool and registers with it according to
assumption A2. This gives C control over the selection of a
TTP then having to rely on a single TTP proposed by M .
Message a: After registration with TTP , C creates a
concatenation which includes; product-ID, a purchase order,
a digital signature on the hash of Order using SiC , PiC only
used in Ti, fresh nonce generated by C and the public signature
veriﬁcation certiﬁcate issued by TTP . The concatenation is
TABLE III. PRE PROTOCOL STAGE
a. C → M : ePwM{product-ID||Order||sSiC [h(Order)]
||PiC ||N1C ||ViCcert} ||sSiC [h(encryption)]
Order=Pseudo-ID-iC||TTP ||payment-method
||product-price
b. M → TTP : ePTTP {Transaction-ID||K1||K−11||Pseudo-ID-iM ||N1M}||sSiM [h(encryption)]
c. TTP → M : ePiM{K1||TTP ||Pseudo-ID-iM
||sSTTP [h(K1||TTP ||Pseudo-ID-iM)]
||Transaction-ID||N1M ||N1TTP }
||sSTTP [h(encryption)]
d. M → PV : ePPV {pseudo-ID-M ||product-description||m||
PM ||product-ID||N2M ||K1||TTP ||Pseudo-ID-
iM ||sSTTP [h(K1||TTP ||Pseudo-ID-iM)]}
||sSM [h(encryption)]
e. PV → M : ePM{PVcert||Encryptcert||N2M ||N1PV }
||sSPV [h(encryption)]
PVcert=X1||sSPV [h(X1)]
X1=product-ID||product-description||eK1{m}
Encryptcert=X2||sSPV [h(X2)]
X2 = h(eK1{m})||K1||TTP ||Pseudo-ID-iM
f. M → TTP : ePTTP {Transaction-ID||Pseudo-ID-iM
||Pseudo-ID-iC||Encryptcert||N1TTP ||N3M}
||sSiM [h(encryption)]
g. TTP → M : ePiM{TTPcommit||N3M ||N2TTP }
||sSTTP [h(encryption)]
TTPcommit=Y1||sSTTP [h(Y1)]
Y1=Transaction-ID||Pseudo-ID-iM
||Pseudo-ID-iC||h(eK1{m})
then encrypted using M ’s advertised public key. The hash
of this encryption is signed by C using SiC to create a
digital signature, represented here as sSiC [h(encryption)].
C appends the digital signature to the encryption and send
both parts to M . For the rest of the protocol descriptions we
use the same notation to represent digital signatures sent in
each message. M could verify the digital signatures using
ViCcert . The Order includes; Pseudo-ID-iC registered with
TTP used only during Ti, TTP chosen and registered by C,
Payment-method to indicate which digital cash system to
use and product-price.
Message b: M after receiving C’s message, registers with
the same TTP according to A2. M creates a concatenation
which includes; a unique transaction ID generated by M for
Ti, public encryption key to be escrowed with TTP , private
decryption key to be escrowed with TTP , Pseudo-ID-iM
registered with TTP used only during Ti and a fresh nonce
generated by M . The concatenation is encrypted using PTTP .
M signs the hash of the encryption using SiM and appends it
to the encryption before sending it to TTP .
Message c: TTP after receiving M ’s message, checks the
compatibility of the public/private key pair to be escrowed. If
satisﬁed, creates a concatenation which includes; K1 , TTP ,
Pseudo-ID-iM (we refer to these as “the three components”),
TTP ’s digital signature on the hash of the three components,
the transaction ID, M ’s nonce and a newly generated nonce
by the TTP . The concatenation is then encrypted using PiM .
TTP signs the hash of the encryption using STTP and appends
it to the encryption before sending it to M .
Message d: Upon receiving TTP ’s message and success-
ful registration with PV according to A1, M now needs to
get product m certiﬁed and encrypted by the PV using K1 es-
crowed with TTP . M creates a concatenation which includes;
pseudo-ID-M , product-description, m, PM , product-ID,
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newly generated nonce by M and the three components &
TTP ’s digital signature on the hash of the three components.
M encrypts the concatenation using PPV . M signs the hash
of the encryption using SM only used with PV according to
A1 and appends it to the encryption before sending it to PV .
Message e: Upon receiving the message, PV checks
whether the product matches its product-description. If it
matches, PV encrypts m using K1 and generates a product
veriﬁer certiﬁcate PVcert which includes X1 and a signed
hash of X1 using SPV . X1 consists of the product−ID,
product−description and encrypted product. At the same time,
PV also veriﬁes TTP ’s digital signature on the three com-
ponents received in the previous message. If satisﬁed, PV
generates an Encryption Certiﬁcate. The Encryptcert includes
X2 and a digital signature on the hash of X2 using SPV .
X2 consists of a hash of the encrypted product and the
three components veriﬁed to have come from TTP . PV then
creates a concatenation which includes; PVcert, Encryptcert,
M ’s nonce N2M and a newly generated nonce N1PV . The
concatenation is then encrypted using PM shared only with
PV . PV signs the hash of the encryption using SPV and
appends the it to the encryption before sending it to M .
Message f: M now creates a concatenation which in-
cludes; the Transaction-ID, Pseudo-ID-iM , Pseudo-ID-
iC, Encryptcert, N1TTP and a newly created nonce by M . M
encrypts the concatenation using PTTP and appends a signed
hash of the encryption using SiM before sending it to TTP .
Here with the Encryptcert, the TTP only receives a hash of
the encryption but not the actual encrypted product.
Message g: Lastly, TTP veriﬁes Encryptcert which
indicates that the product was encrypted using key K1 es-
crowed with TTP . The TTP issues a commitment certiﬁcate
called that TTPcommit. TTP creates a concatenation which
includes; the TTPcommit, M ’s previous nonce and N2TTP .
TTP encrypts the concatenation using PiM and appends a
signed hash of the encryption using STTP before sending it
to M . The TTPcommit includes Y1 and a digital signature of
TTP by signing the hash of Y1 using STTP . Y1 consists of
the Transaction-ID, Pseudo-ID-iM , Pseudo-ID-iC and
a hash of the encrypted product.
B. Main Protocol Stage
Following completion of the pre protocol stage, M exam-
ines the TTPcommit received from the TTP and initiates the
main protocol. Main protocol messages are listed in Table IV
and described in detail below.
Message 1: M creates a concatenation which includes;
the product-ID, a newly created Invoice, a digital signature
by signing the hash of the Invoice using SiM to indicate
that M agrees with the terms of the transaction, N1C , newly
generated nonce, PVcert, TTPcommit, M ’s public signature
veriﬁcation certiﬁcate issued by TTP and a predeﬁned time-
out. M encrypts the concatenation using PiC and appends a
digital signature created by signing the hash of the encryption
using SiM . The Invoice consists of the Transaction-ID,
product-price, payment-method, Pseudo-ID-iC, Pseudo-
ID-iM , TTP and M ’s one-time Bitcoin public key (address).
C after receiving M ’s message, decrypts the message and
retrieves ViMcert to verifyM ’s digital signature. C veriﬁes that
TABLE IV. MAIN PROTOCOL MESSAGES.
1. M → C : ePiC{product-ID||Invoice||sSiM [h(Invoice)]
||N1C ||N4M ||PVcert||TTPcommit||ViMcert ||ú}||sSiM [h(encryption)]
Invoice={Transaction-ID||product-price
||payment-method||Pseudo-ID-iC||Pseudo-
ID-iM ||TTP ||BPM}
2. C → M : ePiM{Invoice||sSiM [h(Invoice)]
||sSiC [h(sSiM [h(Invoice)])]
||N4M ||N2C ||h(eK1{m})||ú−payment}
||sSiC [h(encryption)]
3. C → BP2P : {amount||BPC ||BPM ||sBSC [TX ||BPM ]
||TX ||T -info}
TX = h(T(X−1)||BPC ||T -info)
4. M → C : ePiC{Invoice||N2C ||N5M ||h(eK1{m})
||K−11 ||ú} ||sSiM [h(encryption)]
PVcert using PV ’s digital signature and TTPcommit using
TTP ’s digital signature appended in the commitment certiﬁ-
cate. The latter assures that TTP has conﬁrmed involvement
in the fair-exchange. C then carries out two main veriﬁcation
steps before proceeding further; Firstly, C obtains product-
ID and product-description from PVcert and compares them
with the details of the product C is willing to purchase as
advertised by M . If condition 1 shown below is satisﬁed
then C is certain that the encrypted product m and it’s
details as certiﬁed by the PV is the intended product that
he/she is about to pay for. Secondly, C generates a hash
of the encrypted product eK1{m} and compares it with the
hash obtained from TTPcommit. If both hashes match, then
condition 2 shown below is satisﬁed. This conﬁrms that the
hash of the encrypted product eK1{m} matches the hash TTP
has conﬁrmed to have the corresponding decryption key for.
This gives assurance to C that after making a payment, if
M misbehaves, prematurely aborts or communication fails,
the product decryption key can still be obtained by initiating
the extended protocol. If and only if conditions 1 & 2 are
satisﬁed, C proceeds to message 2 or else C aborts the protocol
and informs both M & TTP the reasons.
Advertised Details = Details found in PVcert——————– 1
Computed h(eK1{m}) = h(eK1{m}) found in TTPcommit ——– 2
Message 2: C creates a concatenation which includes;
Invoice, M ’s digital signature on the invoice, a digital
signature by signing the hash of M ’s digital signature
sSiM [h(Invoice)] using SiC to indicate that C agrees with
the terms of the transaction, N4M , newly generated nonce by
C, hash of the encrypted product and a predeﬁned time-out
ú−payment. The concatenation is then encrypted using PiM
and a signed hash of the encryption using SiC is appended
before sending it to M .
Message 3: Immediately after sending message 2, C makes
a Bitcoin payment to M ’s Bitcoin address BPM . TX is a hash
of the Bitcoin transaction from C to M . The hash includes the
previous transaction hash linking to this transaction, Bitcoin
public key of C and other transaction information relevant to
this transaction. The message includes the transferring amount,
C’s one-time Bitcoin public key, M ’s one-time Bitcoin public
key, digital signature created by signing the transaction hash
TX using C’s Bitcoin private signature key BSC , a transaction
hash TX and other information related to the transaction.
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Upon receiving, random peers in the Bitcoin network start
creating a new block with the transaction information as
follows; A peer computes a new block which includes the hash
T(X+1) from this transaction. In BP2P every peer engages in
computing blocks simultaneously. Due to this reason only the
ﬁrst valid block created is veriﬁed by other peers to be genuine
and a new record is added to the Block Chain. The Bitcoin
network at the same time checks whether the Bitcoins have
been spent previously to detect double spending.
Message 4: M after receiving C’s Bitcoin payment, now
needs to send C the product decryption key K−11 . M creates
a concatenation which includes; the Invoice, N2C , a newly
generated nonce, h(eK1{m}), K−11 and a time-out. The con-
catenation is then encrypted using PiC .M signs the hash of the
encryption using SiM and appends it to the encryption before
sending. If the main protocol messages complete successfully
then C decrypts the product and M updates Transaction-ID
as completed in his/her record.
C. Extended Protocol Stage
In the event of after C making a Bitcoin payment ifM mis-
behaves by sending an incorrect decryption key, prematurely
aborts or a communication failure happens then C initiates the
extended protocol as listed in Table V and described below.
TABLE V. EXTENDED PROTOCOL MESSAGES.
I. C → TTP : ePTTP {BlockchainEvidence||Invoice
||sSiM [h(Invoice)]||N3C ||h(eK1{m})
||TTPcommit||ú} ||sSiC [h(encryption)]
II. TTP → M : ePiM{BlockchainEvidence||Invoice
||sSiM [h(Invoice)]||KeyRequest
||N3TTP ||ú−resolve} ||sSTTP [h(encryption)]
III. M → TTP : ePTTP {Invoice||K−11 ||N3TTP ||N6M ||ú}||sSiM [h(encryption)]
IV. TTP → C : ePiC{Invoice||K−11 ||N3C ||N4TTP ||ú}||sSTTP [h(encryption)]
Message I: C creates a concatenation which includes; the
blockchain evidence showing the Bitcoin transfer from the C
to M ’s Bitcoin address, Invoice, M ’s digital signature on the
hash of Invoice received in message 1, a newly generated
nonce by C, hash of the encrypted product generated by C,
TTPcommit and a predeﬁned time-out. C encrypts the message
using PTTP and appends a digital signature using SiC .
Message II: TTP after receiving the previous message,
examines the evidence. The TTPcommit conﬁrms that TTP
is involved in the transaction and sSiM [h(Invoice)] con-
ﬁrms that M has agreed to Ti. The BlockchainEvidence
is veriﬁed by TTP by looking in to the Bitcoin BlockChain
and it conﬁrms the Bitcoin payment from C to M . TTP
in response, creates a concatenation which includes; the
BlockchainEvidence, Invoice, M ’s digital signature on the
hash of the Invoice, a KeyRequest from the TTP requesting
for K−11 , a newly created nonce by the TTP and a predeﬁned
time-out ú−resolve. TTP encrypts the concatenation using PiM
and appends a signed hash of the encryption using STTP
before sending it to M .
Message III: If M has not disappeared after receiving C’s
payment, misbehaved or deliberately refusing to communicate,
then once TTP ’s key request is received, M checks the
status of the Transaction-ID. If it has not completed, M
creates a concatenation which includes; Invoice, the product
decryption key, N3TTP , a newly generated nonce by M and
a predeﬁned time-out. M encrypts the concatenation using
PTTP and appends a signed hash of the encryption using SiM
before sending it to TTP .
Message IV: If M responds to TTP ’s key request within
ú−resolve, TTP proceeds to message IV as normal but if
M ’s response is not received then TTP retrieves the product
decryption key escrowed with itself and create message IV. In
either scenario, TTP creates a concatenation which includes;
Invoice, K−11 , N3C , a newly generated nonce and a time-
out. TTP encrypts the concatenation using PiC and appends
a signed hash of the encryption using STTP . C after receiving
this message can successfully decrypt the product.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the proposed protocol is reviewed to see
whether it achieves the objectives outlined in Section IV.
 Strong Fair-Exchange: It should be noted that if a
party aborts the protocol before C makes the Bitcoin payment
in Message 3, fair-exchange is not affected as neither party
gains an advantage from the other. This means that M will
not be made a Bitcoin payment and C will not be able to
decrypt the product. If both C and M followed the protocol
without misbehaving or prematurely aborting, the protocol
completes without an extended protocol stage. The following
scenarios are also taken into account;
M sends a wrong encrypted product: M gains no
advantage by this act as C only proceeds to make a payment
once conditions 1 & 2 are satisﬁed.
M sends a wrong product decryption key: In this scenario
C initiates the extended protocol by sending all gathered
evidences to TTP as shown in Message I in the dispute
resolution. At the end of the extended protocol TTP forwards
C the correct decryption key.
M after receiving payment demands more payment: In
this scenario C initiates the extended protocol and TTP by
looking in to evidence C has provided in Message I would
determine that M agreed to the terms of the transaction and
the price by digitally signing the Invoice.
M disappears after receiving payment or aborts: The
extended protocol is initiated by C.
C pays M less than the agreed amount: M only sends
the decryption key if full payment is received. Due to this C
doesn’t gain any advantage by making partial payments.
C pays M less and initiates the extended protocol: If
C claims deceivingly that the amount paid is what he/she
agreed, then upon enquiry by TTP in Message III, M could
send signed purchase order sSiC [h(Order)] in Message c,
and if received sSiC [h(sSiM [h(Invoice)])] in Message 2,
which both includes C’s digital signature agreeing to the
terms of the transaction.
C collude with TTP: Since C chooses the TTP , C is more
likely to collude with TTP than M . This may disadvantage
M as TTP could send C the escrowed decryption key before
C’s Bitcoin payment to M . However, anonymity of M cannot
be breached this way as M never reveals the real identity.
M collude with TTP:This may disadvantage C as TTP
could send C an incorrect decryption key in the extended
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stage after C’s Bitcoin payment to M . However, anonymity
of C is not breached.
C and M collude together: As both parties are dishonest
there is no fair-exchange to be achieved.
Considering the above analysis it is evident that the pro-
tocol guarantees that if one party misbehaves the other party
doesn’t incur any loss or have to resolve any disputes with the
manual intervention of an external judge after the protocol.
Instead, disputes can be resolved within the protocol itself.
All these properties constitute strong fair-exchange.
 Anonymity: Both C and M never reveal their real
identities or personal details at any stage of the protocol.
Instead, they use per-transaction pseudo-IDs and public/private
key pairs. M interacts with C and TTP using Pseudo-ID-
iM only used in Ti and with PV using pseudo-ID-M for
product registrations. C interacts with M and TTP using
pseudo-ID-iC and does not interact with PV . Due to these
aspects anonymity of C and M is not only guaranteed between
each other but also to PV and TTP . A party trying to collude
with PV or TTP to ﬁnd the real identity of the other, would
not gain any beneﬁt other than what they already know. e.g. M
colluding with TTP to identify C. In addition to pseudonyms
both C and M set-up anonymity channels for communication
between each other and other parties as in A5. It is common
practise while making Bitcoin payments to use an anonymiser
such as the TOR Browser. C makes the Bitcoin payment
to a one-time Bitcoin address generated by M . Similarly C
generates a one-time Bitcoin address to receive Bitcoins as
change only if there are any. TTP does not get to know
about the Bitcoin transaction and addresses unless the extended
protocol is executed.
By looking at one’s Bitcoin address, the true identity of
the user cannot be revealed. However, due to the necessity
of having to broadcast all transactions publicly prevents the
anonymity of Bitcoin payment transactions. This has become a
drawback and with the advancements in computational power
and access to Data Analysis capabilities, it may be possible
to link Bitcoin transactions to real user identities [18], [14].
Therefore, in Section VI, we add an extension to our protocol
to support Zerocoin/Zerocash system proposed in [15], [5] to
provide improved privacy grantees and full anonymity.
 Privacy of exchanged product: TTP involved does
not get to see m or keep a copy of it. TTP does not get to
know any information related to product m until the extended
protocol is initiated. Even then the details included in Invoice
are not sufﬁcient for TTP to ﬁnd out what was exchanged.
 Security properties: The protocol messages are en-
crypted to provide conﬁdentiality and a nonce conﬁrms mes-
sage freshness. Registered pseudonym-IDs and digital signa-
tures provide non-repudiation. The digital signatures appended
provides message integrity. The predeﬁned time-outs provide
timeliness and lets a sending party to resend a message once
more if a response is not received, to complete the protocol
by aborting or to complete the protocol by resolving with the
TTP without letting the protocol go in to an inﬁnite loop.
A. Other Properties
Minimum involvement of TTP: The protocol keeps the
involvement of the TTP to a minimum by using an off-line
TTP . The TTP is not required to intervene in the protocol
unless a transacting party misbehaves, prematurely aborts or
a communication failure happens, which makes the protocol
optimistic.
 Dispute resolution: Disputes are resolved automatically
within the protocol run without manual intervention of an
external judge.
 Other digital cash support: Even though more em-
phasis was given to Bitcoin as the payment method for the
protocol, it also can be adapted to support other digital cash
systems that are designed using a public ledger/block chain.
A generalised example of how the protocol can be adapted to
support other digital cash systems similar to Bitcoin designed
with the concept of providing anonymous payments using
pseudonymous addresses and publishing every transaction in a
public ledger is explained here. C informs M the currency that
he/she would like to use in the payment-method in Message
a. M later sends an address relevant to the selected payment
method in Message 1. C makes a payment to M using the
chosen payment system. If things go according to plan and M
sends the decryption key then the protocol completes without
further changes. However to support the extended protocol
stage, C could present evidence from the relevant public ledger
of the digital currency system in Message I. This evidence may
include the publicly available transaction record of the payment
made from one-time address of the payer to the one-time
address of the payee. This provides enough evidence for the
TTP to continue with the rest of the protocol without further
changes. In Section VI a more detailed explanation is given
while extending our protocol to support Zerocoin/Zerocash
which works differently to the generalised example due to
increased anonymity as well as privacy of transaction details
published in the block chain.
VI. EXTENSION TO SUPPORT ZEROCOIN/ZEROCASH
To make cross-referring easy for the reader, we slightly
divert from our protocol notation to match the notation in
corresponding papers [5], [15].
TABLE VI. NOTATION USED FOR ZEROCOIN/ZEROCASH EXTENSION
ZP2P : Zerocash System integrated into Bitcoin P2P Network.
PRF : Pseudorandom function.
COMM : Statistically-hiding non-intractive commitment scheme.
zk-SNARK : zero-knowledge Succinct Non-interactive ARguments of
Knowledge.
rt : A root of Merkle tree at a given time.
apkx : Address Public Key of entity X (X’s Zerocoin address).
askx : Address Secret Key of entity X .
zx : A Zerocoin that is owned by entity X .
zoldx : A Zerocoin that is owned by entity X and is used to pour
it’s value to new coins.
vx : The value of entity X’s Zerocoin.
vpub : A non-negative public output value that can be used to
pay a target similar to a Bitcoin address as speciﬁed in a
transaction string info.
ρx : A secret value that determines snx of entity X’s coin.
snx : A serial number derived as snx = PRF snaskx
(ρx).
cmx : A coin commitment of entity X’s coin (a string
that appears in the public ledger) constructed
as kx = COMMrx (apkx ||ρx) and cmx =
COMMsx (vx||kx) where rx & sx are random.
txMint : A mint transaction records; when a new coin z with com-
mitment cm and value v has been minted.
πPOUR : : A zk-SNARK proof that states; “Given rt, old snx, new
commitments cmx and cmy , I know coins zold, new coins
zx, zy and old address secret key askx ”.
49
txPour : A pour transaction is used to spend, split, merge or transfer
ownership of anonymous coins to others. Pour records the
pouring of a old coin/two coins (zoldx ) with their corre-
sponding serial numbers (snoldx ) into two new coins (zx,
zy) with their commitments (cmx, cmy) in the public
ledger. It also records rt, vpub, info and πPOUR.
The modiﬁed protocol messages, in order to support our
extension to Zerocash system are listed in Table VII and
described in detail below.
TABLE VII. PROTOCOL EXTENSION TO ZEROCOIN/ZEROCASH.
f. M → TTP : ePTTP {Transaction-ID||Pseudo-ID-iM
||Pseudo-ID-iC||Encryptcert||N1TTP
||N3M ||cmm} ||sSiM [h(encryption)]
g. TTP → M : TTPcommit=Y1||sSTTP [h(Y1)]
Y1=Transaction-ID||Pseudo-ID-
iM ||Pseudo-ID-iC||h(eK1{m})||cmm
1. M → C : Invoice={Transaction-
ID||product-price||payment-
method||Pseudo-ID-iC||Pseudo-ID-
iM ||TTP ||apkm ||vm||ρm||rm||sm}
3. C → ZP2P : zm = (apkm ||vm||ρm||rm||sm||cmm)
zc = (apkc ||vc||ρc||rc||sc||cmc)
txPour = (rt||snold||cmm||cmc||πPOUR
||vpub||info)
I. C → TTP : ePTTP {cmm||Invoice
||sSiM [h(Invoice)]||N3C ||h(eK1{m})
||TTPcommit||ú} ||sSiC [h(encryption)]
II. TTP → M : ePiM{cmm||Invoice
||sSiM [h(Invoice)]||KeyRequest
||N3TTP ||ú−resolve} ||sSTTP [h(encryption)]
Message f: In order for C to make a Zerocoin payment,
M generates a new address key pair (apkm , apkm ) and a secret
value ρm. M now construct a coin commitment cmm as km
= COMMrm(apkm ||ρm) and cmm = COMMsm(vm||km)
where rm & sm are random. M now appends cmm to
Messages f for TTP ’s record.
Message g: After receiving cmm from the previous mes-
sage, TTP keeps a record of cmm and includes it as part of the
commitment certiﬁcate TTPcommit. The purpose of this is that
when C receives TTPcommit in Messages 1, it gives assurance
for C that TTP is aware of the corresponding commitment of
M ’s coin that is due to appear in the public ledger. C can also
check the validity of cmm by reconstructing it using secret
values apkm , vm, ρm, rm, sm received in Messages 1.
Message 1: M makes a slight change to the Invoice to
include the address public key apkm instead of the Bitcoin
address used in the previous protocol. M also includes secret
values vm, ρm, rm, sm to provide required information for c
to make an anonymous payment to M ’s address. We let M
generate these details instead of C to; 1) keep the protocol
simple by not requiring a key-private encryption scheme to
download these secret values in encrypted format from the
public ledger as speciﬁed in the paper [5]. The main reason
for this is that we have already established a secure channel in
our protocol. 2) for M to generate the coin commitment and
get it added to TTPcommit before C makes a payment.
Message 3: Immediately after sending Messages 2, C
prepares to make a Zerocoin payment using the Zerocash
system. Assuming C is a Bitcoin user, he/she now needs to
deposit a Bitcoin with a backing escrow pool in the Zerocash
system in order to mint a new Zerocoin (this step of minting
a coin can be skipped if C already holds zerocoins). Due to
the reason of C using this newly minted coin to make new
coins, we add the notation old to it’s parameters. Firstly, C
generates a new address key pair (aoldpkc , a
old
pkc
) and a secret
value ρoldc which determines coin z
old
c ’s serial number sn
old
c
= PRF sn
aoldskc
(ρoldc ). It is assumed that these serial numbers
are collision resistant. C now generates cmoldc as; k
old
c =
COMMroldc (a
old
pkc
||ρoldc ) and cmoldc = COMMsoldc (voldc ||koldc )
where roldc & s
old
c are random. The minting outputs a new coin
and a mint transaction;
zoldc = (a
old
pkc
||voldc ||ρoldc ||roldc ||soldc ||cmoldc )
txMint = (voldc ||koldc ||soldc ||cmoldc )
To spend the newly created coin, C carries out a pour
operation which takes zoldc as input coin and pours it’s value
into two fresh coins; zm & zc. C uses zm to make M ’s
payment and zc to pay any change back from the transaction
to him/her-self. To create these two coins C ﬁrstly, generates
commitment cmm for M ’s coin using the secret values re-
ceived in Messages 1, such that; km = COMMrm(apkm ||ρm)
and cmm = COMMsm(vm||km). C also at this point checks
whether the constructed commitment matches the one found
in TTPcommit. C now generates the commitment for his/her
own new coin such that; kc = COMMrc(apkc ||ρc) and cmc =
COMMsc(vc||kc) where rc & sc are random. Following this,
C produces a πPOUR proof according to [5] and the serial
number snoldc = PRF
sn
aoldskc
(ρoldc ). The pour operation outputs
two new coins and a txPour that is appended to the public
ledger.
zm = (apkm ||vm||ρm||rm||sm||cmm)
zc = (apkc ||vc||ρc||rc||sc||cmc)
txPour = (rt||snold||cmm||cmc||πPOUR||vpub||info)
M who is expecting a Zerocoin payment from C can
now start using the received coin without having to scan the
entire public ledger using the Receive algorithm beforehand
as speciﬁed in [5]. This is due to M knowing cmm and the
private values that was used to generate it before receiving the
payment. If M wants, the value of the received coin can be
poured in to a new coin owned by M using the pour operation
soon after receiving, making it’s parameters such as the coin
commitment only known to M or the value can be transferred
to another owner as C did.
Messages I: If things go according to plan M sends the
decryption key in Messages 4 and the protocol completes
without going to an extended stage. However, after C mak-
ing a payment, if M misbehaves by sending an incorrect
decryption key, prematurely aborts or a communication failure
happens then C appends cmm and the new Invoice instead of
BlockchainEvidence in Messages I to initiate the extended
protocol. Note that TTP does not see Invoice unless the
protocol goes through to a extended phase.
Messages II: TTP after receiving C’s message checks
whether cmm matches the one in TTPcommit and queries
whether cmm has appeared in the public ledger. TTP may
use the secret values (vm, ρm, rm, sm) found in the Invoice
for this task. If it has, this gives assurance to TTP that a
payment was made to M ’s Zerocoin address corresponding
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to the coin’s commitment cmm. If satisﬁed, TTP sends the
KeyRequest message to M which also includes cmm. In
either scenario, whether M forwards the product decryption
key or not within the predeﬁned time-out, TTP retrieves the
escrowed decryption key and forwards it to C.
A. Security & Anonymity
Even though the previous protocol achieves anonymity
using Bitcoin as the payment method, recent work has shown
that it may be possible to link Bitcoin transactions to real
identities [18], [14]. Our extension to support Zerocash ad-
dresses this issue while providing improved transaction privacy
& anonymity for users. The protocol objectives as discussed
in Section V are still achieved even though a separate analysis
is not mentioned here due to space limitation. When C
makes a payment to M using our extension the corresponding
transaction record is not publicly available in the ledger. It
should also be noted that despite the fact that C & TTP gets
to know M ’s secret values (vm, ρm, rm, sm) and commitment
cmm, coin zm cannot be spend by either of these two parties
as address secret key askm is only known by M . In addition
when M spends zm, it still cannot be traced as the output serial
number snm = PRF snaskm (ρm) is not revealed at any stage of
our protocol.
VII. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
The paper identiﬁed that genuine Bitcoin users are reluctant
to make Bitcoin payments in e-commerce transactions due
to transaction irreversibility. The proposed protocol achieves
strong fair-exchange while preserving anonymity of the trans-
acting parties. TTP agreed between C & M does not get
to see the exchanged product or store a copy of it. The
involvement of TTP is kept to a minimum and disputes are
resolved within the protocol. The protocol can also be adapted
to use other digital cash systems with public ledgers. We
outline a drawback in Bitcoin that raises anonymity concerns
and we add an extension to support Zerocash which addresses
this issue while providing improved transaction privacy &
anonymity for users. Future work could be outlined as; pub-
lishing formal analysis of the protocol that we are currently
carrying out using Casper-FDR, making improvements in order
to support exchange of physical products, further reduce the
involvement of a signiﬁcant TTP by using distributed TTP s.
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